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Abstract

Does the Establishment Clause Require
Religion to be Confined to the Private Sphere?

Kevin Pybas
Through the first four decades or so of the U.S. Supreme Court’s church-state
jurisprudence the Court generally sought to confine religion to the private sphere, on the
grounds that the establishment clause requires such a result. While the Rehnquist Court
has been more open to religion in the public sphere than previous Courts, the claim that
the establishment clause requires religion to be restricted to the private sphere retains
strong support among a minority of Supreme Court justices. Witness Justice Souter’s
fierce objection, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), to the Court’s approval of the use
of publicly funded tuition vouchers in religious schools, proclaiming not only that the
constitution relegates religion to the private sphere but that religious freedom itself is
partly premised on the notion that religion be kept “relatively private.”
The aim of this paper is to critically examine the rationales—respect for rights of
conscience, to protect the health and vigor of religion, and the preservation of social
peace—upon which the privatization principle rests. While these are appropriate issues
to focus upon, the “privatization” justices do so abstractly and uncritically, with little
attention to the lived, historical reality of religion’s involvement in the public sphere.
Analyzing these issues in a highly abstract fashion, I argue, leads those justices who wish
to confine religion to the private sphere to ignore real issues of religious liberty.
Consequently, instead of a searching inquiry into how, amidst deep religious diversity
and an ever expanding regulatory state, religious liberty can be protected for all, abstract,
conclusory arguments about the purported objective of the establishment clause are
offered.
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INTRODUCTION
A recurring theme in the U.S. Supreme Court’s establishment clause
jurisprudence is the claim that the First Amendment requires religion to be confined to
the private sphere.1 In the case that launched the Supreme Court’s modern establishment
clause jurisprudence—Everson v. Board of Education2—for example, Justice Rutledge,
dissenting from the Court’s approval of the use of public funds to reimburse
transportation costs to families whose children attended Catholic schools, objected on the
grounds that religion and religious schooling “is exclusively a private affair.”3 Similarly,
writing for the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 where it ruled that it was unconstitutional
for the states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania to supplement the salaries of teachers
teaching secular subjects in parochial schools, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the
“[c]onstitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the
family, and the institutions of private choice.”5 The privatization principle, if it may be
called that, thus seeks to deny religion any role in public life.6
While the Supreme Court through the first four decades or so of its establishment
clause jurisprudence largely sought to restrict religion to the private sphere, the Rehnquist
1

See Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A “Privatization” Theory of Religion Clause Cases, 30 St. Louis
U.L.J. 275 (1986); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 19 (1991), and Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion,
42 B.C. L. Rev. 771 (2001). Bradley, as the title of his article suggests, focuses on the way in which the
First Amendment has been used by the Supreme Court to minimize the role of religion in public life.
Myers, on the other hand, focuses not only on religion cases but also substantive due process cases and the
extent to which the Court, or various members of it, have sought to limit the role of religious beliefs in
lawmaking. Garnett argues that the limitation on political speech and activities imposed on religious
institutions receiving tax exemptions wrongly communicates the message that religion is purely a private
matter.
2
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3
Id. at 53.
4
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5
Id. at 625.
6
Noting this, Justice Scalia once heatedly accused some of his colleagues of treating religion like
pornography, i.e., as “some purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret . . . in the
privacy of one’s room.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court has not followed suit, at least not in public assistance cases.7 It has instead evinced
an openness to religion in public life not found in earlier years. Even so, a minority of
justices on the Rehnquist Court remain firmly committed to the notion that religion
should be restricted to the private sphere. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,8 for example,
Justice Souter fiercely objected to the Court’s approval of the use of publicly funded
tuition vouchers in religious schools, proclaiming not only thatthe constitution relegates
religion to the private sphere but that religious freedom itself is partly premised on the
notion that religion be kept “relatively private.”9 The establishment clause banishes
religion to the private sphere, Justice Souter insists, in order to “guarantee the right of
individual conscience against compulsion, to protect the integrity of religion against the
corrosion of secular support, and to preserve the unity of political society against the
implied exclusion of the less favored and the antagonism of controversy over public
support for religious causes.”10
The aim of this essay is to critically examine the rationales—respect for rights of
conscience, to protect the health and vigor of religion, and the preservation of social
7

See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing a state-employed signlanguage interpreter to assist a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic high school); Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that a public university does
not violate the establishment clause when it makes student activity funds available to various student
groups, including a student-run religious organization, on the basis of neutral criteria); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (allowing state-employed teachers to offer instruction in remedial and enrichment
courses in parochial schools) (overruling Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a federal law
providing instructional materials such as library books, media materials, and computers to religious
schools) (overruling parts of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S.
229 (1977)); and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding an Ohio law providing
tuition assistance to students enrolled in religious schools). See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
(upholding the constitutionality of a Minnesota law allowing parents to take a tax deduction for school
expenses, irrespective of whether their children attended public or private schools, including parochial
schools); and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (finding no
constitutional violation in allowing a college student to use neutrally available state vocational
rehabilitation assistance funds at a Christian college).
8
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
9
Id. at 716.
10
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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peace—upon which the privatization principle rests. I will argue that the reasons given in
support of the privatization claim are unpersuasive, indeed that the stated reasons hardly
rise to the level of an argument. My argument is not that Justice Souter and other justices
who wish to confine religion to the private sphere are wrong to focus on rights of
conscience or the potential for religion to become corrupted or civic peace but that they
do so abstractly and uncritically, with little attention to the lived, historical reality of
religion’s involvement in the public sphere. Approaching the question from such a high
level of abstraction, I argue, leads the “privatization” justices to gloss over real issues of
religious liberty. Instead of a deep reflection on the most desirable relationship between
religion and government in the contemporary context of pluralism and a far-reaching
regulatory state, the privatization justices dogmatically insist that the establishment
clause was intended to confine religion to the private sphere. I do not deny that there are
good reasons why religion should in some circumstances be relegated to the private
sphere. The facile character of the claim that the constitution always requires it,
however, leaves the strongimpression that the privatization position rests not so much
upon a careful sifting of evidence or a thoughtful consideration of how religious liberty
can be advanced for all—the religious and nonreligious alike—but upon unexamined
notions about how liberal society can be made to work.
This essay is largely critical. I thus do not here explore the philosophical
commitments that seem to be embedded in the privatization position. 11 Nor do I try
11

In a companion essay in progress, tentatively titled “Two Concepts of Liberalism in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence,” I argue that the privatization of religion interpretation of the establishment clause
seems to be rooted in an understanding of the liberal political tradition that regards religion and ways of life
rooted in it to be inferior to reason and the examined life. With a negative view of religion as the starting
point, the conclusion that the constitution restricts religion to the private sphere seems not so much the
result of careful constitutional inquiry but as an outcome foreordained from the outset. I argue further that
the Rehnquist Court’s qualified acceptance of religion in the public sphere seems rooted in a different
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either to defend the Rehnquist Court’s greater acceptance of religion in the public sphere
or to demarcate the appropriate boundary between religion and the state. With these
caveats in mind, Part I briefly summarizes current establishment clause doctrine,
highlighting the Rehnquist Court’s different approaches to religious practices in
government schools versus public aid that benefits religious schools. The aim in Part I is
not to give a detailed account of the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence, or to try
to synthesize its various pronouncements on church-state issues, but to briefly describe
important doctrinal changes the Rehnquist Court has fashioned as regards religion in the
public sphere. As the Court has become more open to religion in the public sphere, those
justices committed to the privatization of religion have been moved to explain more
thoroughly their views as to why religion should be confined to the private sphere. Part
II closely examines these arguments, focusing on the rationales given in support of the
privatization commitment. While many justices have been committed to confining
religion to the private sphere,12 I primarily focus on the opinions of Justice Souter, who
has more clearly explained the reasons therefore. Part III summarizes and restates my
criticisms of the claim that the establishment clause restricts religion to the private
sphere.

understanding of the liberal political tradition and the place of religion in it than that which informs the
commitment to confine religion to the private sphere.
12
Richard Myers noted in 1991 that Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens “consistently”
sought to confine religion to the private sphere. Myers, supra 1, at 79. Among current justices, Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and of course Stevens do so as well. See the dissenting opinions in Mitchell and Zelman.
Justice Breyer’s commitment to privatizing religion seems to be context specific. For example, he joined
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Mitchell approving of the use in religious schools of instructional
materials purchased with federal funds. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 836 (O’Connor, J., concurring). He objected
to the tuition vouchers at issue in Zelman, however, because they “differ . . . in both kind and degree from
aid programs upheld in the past.” That is, he objected because the vouchers “direct financing to a core
function of the church: the teaching of religious truths to young children” and because they involve “a
considerable shift of taxpayer dollars from public secular schools to private religious schools.” Zelman,
536 U.S. at 726-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting.) See infra text accompanying notes 170-73.
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I. Contemporary Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The Rehnquist Court draws a distinction between government directly supporting
or endorsing religion and the expenditure of public funds in religious institutions upon
the free choice of public aid recipients. In situations involving the government in the
direct support of religion, the Rehnquist Court has not deviated from earlier judgments
about the unconstitutionality of such practices.13 For example, it has invalidated a state
law prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary theory in public schools and universities
unless creation science was also taught,14 the practice of placing an unadorned Christian
nativity scene inside a county courthouse,15 clergy-led public school graduation
ceremony prayers,16 and student-led prayers at public school athletic events.17 While the
rationale the Court gave for striking each practice varied from the lack of a secular
purpose,18 to impermissible endorsement,19 to governmental coercion,20 at bottom the
problem was that each law or practice involved the government in the direct support or

13

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (forbidding state-sponsored nondenominational prayer in which
student participation was voluntary); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(forbidding commencing the school day with teacher-led Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary
theory in public schools and universities); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (forbidding the posting of
the Ten Commandments in school rooms ); and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (barring
commencing the school day with a moment of silence for either meditation or voluntary prayer).
14
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
15
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
16
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
17
Santa Fe Ind. School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
18
“In this case, appellants have identified no clear secular purpose for the [law].” Edwards, 482 U.S. at
585.
19
“[The county] has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a patently
Christian message . . . nothing more is required to demonstrate a violation of the Establishment Clause.”
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601-2.
20
“No holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a student to participate in a
religious exercise. That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 599. “Even if we regard every high school student’s decision to attend a
home football game as purely voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame
prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.”
Santa Fe Ind. School Dist., 530 U.S. at 312.
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sponsorship of religion, which violates the Court’s interpretation of the establishment
clause as requiring governmental neutrality towards religion.
As is well known, “neutrality” was established as the constitutional benchmark
for church-state issues in Everson v. Board of Education,21 where the Court declared that
the establishment clause requires “the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers.”22 The meaning of “neutrality” is of course not
self-evident, but in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman23 the Court synthesized its post-Everson
establishment clause rulings and famously declared that government acts neutrally with
regard to religion when its laws have secular purposes, the primary effects of which
neither promote nor hinder religion, and which do not lead to an “excessive
entanglement” of religion and the government.24 Although the Lemon test was given as a
standard for establishment clause issues, it is not clear that it has made much of a
difference in the Court’s treatment of religious practices in government institutions. In
the five post-Lemon cases the Court has decided involving religion in the public schools,
for example, three were decided on the basis of a lack of a secular purpose—Stone v.
Graham,25 Wallace v. Jaffree,26 and Edwards v. Aguillard,27—indicating that a three-part

21

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 18.
23
403 U.S. 602.
24
Id. at 612-13. The secular purpose test was drawn from Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), where the Court declared unconstitutional laws requiring Bible reading, without comment, in the
public schools at the beginning of each school day. The primary effect test was first announced in Bd. of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), where the Court affirmed a state law requiring local school
districts to lend textbooks without charge to parochial school students. The excessive entanglement prong
was first articulated in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), where the Court ruled that tax
exemptions for property owned by religious organizations that is used exclusively for religious purposes do
not violate the establishment clause.
25
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments in school rooms).
26
472 U.S. 38 (1985) (barring commencing the school day with a moment of silence for either meditation
or voluntary prayer).
27
482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary theory in public
schools and universities unless creation science was also taught).
22
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test is wholly unnecessary for deciding these types of cases. And the other two—Lee v.
Weisman,28 and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe29—were decided without
resort to the Lemon test.30 The Lemon test was likewise ignored in Marsh v. Chambers,31
where the Court ruled, mainly on historical grounds, that state legislative chaplains do not
violate the establishment clause.
While the Lemon test appears to have had little impact in cases involving the
government in the direct support of religion, it has featured more prominently in the
Court’s effort to distinguish permissible versus impermissible governmental aid to
religious institutions.32 To be sure, as in the religion-in-government cases, the Court

28

505 U.S. 577 (1992).
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
30
“Our decision in Lee v. Weisman[] conspicuously avoided using the supposed [Lemon] test . . . .”
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
31
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
32
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (declaring unconstitutional on excessive
entanglement grounds state laws that supplemented the salaries of teachers teaching secular subjects in
religious schools); Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 757 (1973)
(striking a New York law that provided various forms of public assistance to private schools (and families
with children enrolled in them) in the state, most of which were religiously affiliated, for advancing
religion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (allowing secular textbooks purchased with public funds
to be loaned to religious schools but disallowing the use of instructional materials purchased with public
money (on advancement grounds) and also prohibiting the provision of auxiliary services, such as
counseling and speech and hearing therapy (on excessive entanglement grounds)); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U. S. 229 (1977) (allowing the use of state-funded standardized tests and scoring services and allowing
state-employed speech and hearing therapists, counselors, doctors, and nurses to examine parochial school
students on school grounds but forbidding public schools from loaning instructional materials to parochial
schools (on advancement grounds) and disallowing the use of public funds for field trip transportation for
parochial school students (on entanglement grounds)); Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (no Lemon violation in a state law providing financial
reimbursement to religious schools for the costs of state-mandated testing and record keeping); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (no Lemon violation in a Minnesota law allowing parents to take a tax
deduction for school tuition costs, irrespective of whether their children attended public or private schools,
including parochial schools); Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (forbidding on advancement grounds (Ball) and excessive entanglement
grounds (Aguilar) the use of state and federal aid to employ public school teachers in parochial schools for
the teaching of remedial, enrichment, and special education courses); and Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (no Lemon violation in allowing a college
student to use neutrally available state vocational rehabilitation assistance funds at a Christian college).
29
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sometimes resolves public aid cases without invoking Lemon.33 More significantly, in
1997 in Agostini v. Felton34 the Lemon test was explicitly modified in two significant
ways as regards its application in aid-to-religion cases. First, the entanglement portion of
the Lemon test was folded into the effects prong of the test. As the Court said of itself
and the Lemon test,
the factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is ‘excessive’ are
similar to the factors we use to examine ‘effect.’ That is, to assess
entanglement, we have looked to ‘the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides,
and the resulting relationship between the government and religious
authority.’ Similarly, we have assessed a law’s ‘effect’ by examining the
character of the institutions benefited (e.g., whether the religious
institutions were ‘predominantly religious’) and the nature of the aid that
the State provided (e.g., whether it was neutral and nonideological).35
Agostini thus reduces the Lemon test to a two-part inquiry: whether the law has a secular
purpose and whether its effect is the advancement of religion. Second and more
significantly is the way Agostini unambiguously alters the inquiry into whether a law
advances religion. Prior to Agostini advancement of religion had generally been found if
the aid provided could be used to support the religious mission of the religious institution.
To this end, a line was generally drawn between aid that the Court believed could be
limited in its use to secular purposes only and aid that could not be so limited.
Consequently, aid that supplied such things as secular textbooks36 and health and

33

See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (no establishment clause violation in
allowing a state-employed sign-language interpreter to assist a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic
high school); and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding
that a public university does not violate the establishment clause when it makes student activity funds
available to various student groups, including a student-run religious organization, on the basis of neutral
criteria.)
34
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (partially overruling Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and
overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
35
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (citations omitted).
36
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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therapeutic services37 was permitted but instructional materials38 and the provision of
remedial and enrichment courses were not.39 In Agostini, however, the Court noted that
its rulings in Witters40 and Zobrest41 had called into question its project of categorizing
aid either as secular or religious. The more telling inquiry, the Court reasoned, was
whether the advancement of religion was attributable to the state or to individuals
exercising “genuinely independent and private choices.”42 Judgments aboutwhether a
law provides genuine choice between secular and religious alternatives, in turn, depends
on whether “the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favors
nor disfavors religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on
a nondiscriminatory basis.”43 In other words, laws that provide neutrally available public
funds on the basis of secular criteria, e.g., financial need, and which provide no
incentives for recipients to choose religious alternatives are nevertheless constitutional
even when the funds are used to further religion. In such instances the “advancement of a
religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably
attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the
disbursement of benefits.”44 Agostini thus made clear that the central inquiry in public
assistance cases was not whether aid could be limited to secular purposes but whether the

37

E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977).
Id.
39
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
40
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
41
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
42
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226 (citing Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 487 (1986)).
43
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231.
44
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
38
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funds that ultimately furthered religion did so directly, which is forbidden, or by the free
and independent choices of aid recipients, which is acceptable.45
Agostini therefore seemed to clearly signal a certain acceptance on the Court’s
behalf of religion in public life that previous cases such as Mueller v. Allen,46 Witters,47
and Zobrest48 had prefigured. The Court’s tolerance of religion in the public sphere was
confirmed in Mitchell v. Helms,49 where the Court reversed course to permit the use of
publicly-purchased instructional materials such as library books, media materials, and
computers in religious schools. The Court’s most recent establishment clause
pronouncement, moreover, finding no establishment clause violation in a state law
providing tuition assistance to students enrolled in religious schools wouldseem to
solidify beyond question its (current) position on religion in public life. 50
What then can we say about the Rehnquist Court’s approach to establishment
clause issues? It seems its approach seeks not so much to confine religion to the private
sphere but to forbid the government’s direct support of it. Religious practices in
government, that is, the public schools, inescapably involve the government in the direct
support of religion. To avoid this, a majority of the Rehnquist Court continues to insist
that the establishment clause requires religion to be confined to the private sphere. “The

45

The Court in Agostini thus ruled that there is no constitutional prohibition to using public funds to
provide remedial and enrichment courses in religious schools when such funds are provided to all students
meeting secular eligibility requirements when there is some modest monitoring scheme in place to make
sure that publicly-paid teachers do not engage in religious instruction. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234-5. To this
end, Agostini completely overruled Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and partially overruled Grand
Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
46
463 U.S. 388 (1983) (no establishment clause violation in a Minnesota law allowing parents of all school
age children to take a tax deduction for school tuition costs, including parents whose children are enrolled
in religious schools).
47
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
48
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
49
530 U.S. 793 (2000) (overruling portions of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977)).
50
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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design of the constitution[,]” Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court in 1992, “is that
preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a
choice committed to the private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that
mission.”51 However, the support of religion present in religion-neutral assistance
programs in which individual aid recipients direct public funds to secular and religious
alternatives of their choosing is attributable to individual choice, not to the government.
In such circumstances individual choice severs the link between government and the
advancement of religion. With religious practices in public schools, however, there is no
individual choice that can be exercised that would cut the impermissible tiebetween
government and the support of religion. The support of religion present in this context
thus seems unavoidably attributable to government.
Focusing on the requirement that government act neutrally towards religion helps
to illustrate the Court’stwo- track approach to these issues. If religious practices in
governmental institutions necessarily involve government in the advancement of religion,
government has then of course failed to act neutrally with regard to religion, which since
Everson the Court has construed to be the command of the establishment clause.52 To
ensure that government acts neutrally with regard to religion in terms of its own
practices, the Court has consistently insisted that religion be restricted to the private
sphere. But what does the principle of neutrality require as regards neutrally available
governmental assistance programs? Lemon and its progeny typically found that
government had advanced religion, or acted non-neutrally towards religion, when public

51
52

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
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funds were used in a way that could be used for religious purposes.53 The Court’s
movement away from classifying the aid in question as supporting either the secular or
religious aspects of a religious institution54 has led to a reconceptualization of what
neutrality means vis-à-vis neutral assistance programs. As the majority opinion in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris55 indicates, neutrality understood as “evenhandedness”
between religious and secular alternatives now appears to be the singular standard
employed by the Court for judging the constitutionality of aid programs in which public
funds wind up in the treasury of religious schools.56 That is, so long asgove rnment
assistance programs have a secular purpose and do not define recipients of aid on the
basis of religion nor attempt to steer recipients toward the religious alternatives by, say,
providing greater assistance to recipients who choose the religious alternative, there is no
violation of the neutrality requirement when recipients themselves direct the funds to
religious institutions.57 Four justices, led by Justice Souter, argue that evenhandedness
alone is not an acceptable constitutional yardstick. Instead, evenhandedness “is to be
considered only along with other characteristics of aid, its administration, its recipients,

53

See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
55
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
56
Id. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 878-884 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(describing three different meanings the Court has ascribed to the word “neutrality”: “as a term to describe
the requisite state of government equipoise between the forbidden encouragement and discouragement of
religion; to characterize a benefit or aid as secular; and to indicate evenhandedness in distributing it.” Id. at
878. The plurality opinion in Mitchell treated evenhandedness as the sole constitutional measure, a
conclusion criticized by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion (Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837-40) and by
Justice Souter in his dissent. The plurality “espouses a new conception of neutrality as a practically
sufficient test of constitutionality that would, if adopted by the Court, eliminate enquiry into a law’s
effects” and the plurality “appears to take evenhandedness neutrality and in practical terms promote it to a
single and sufficient test establishment constitutionality of school aid.” Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 869, 900
(Souter, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor now appears to agree, however, that evenhandedness alone
satisfies the First Amendment, giving it precedential value that the Mitchell plurality opinion could not.
See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 669-70 (O’Connor, J., concurring) and Zelman, 536 U.S. at 696 n.6 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
57
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653-54.
54
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or its potential that have been emphasized over the years as indicators of just how
religious the intent and effect of a given aid scheme really is.”58 On this view, even a
genuinely neutral public aid program59 that ends up subsidizing the religious mission of
religious schools through the free and independent choices of aid recipients is
unconstitutional.60 This is so, Justice Souter argues,because public aid that supports the
religious mission of a religious institution violates “every objective supposed to be served
by the bar against establishment.”61 These objectives include “respect for freedom of
conscience . . . , sav[ing] religion from its own corruption”62 and “protecting the Nation’s
social fabric from religious conflict.”63 It is to an examination of each of these rationales
underpinning the privatization thesis that I now wish to turn.

58

Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 884 (Souter, J., dissenting).
It should be noted that Justice Souter denies that the voucher program at issue in Zelman is neutral. In
his view, the voucher program provides recipients with a financial incentive to select religious schooling.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 697-98 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Zelman majority, on the other hand, concluded
that the program provides financial incentives for public schooling. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653-54. The
dispute as to whether the voucher program provided incentives or disincentives for religious schooling is
beyond my interest here but it is worth noting that the disagreement seems to turn on how to count the
amount of state funding available to students choosing to remain in public school. Justice Souter focuses
on the fact that the state of Ohio offers up to $2,250 tuition assistance for students who opt out of the
Cleveland public schools but only up to $324 in tutoring assistance for the students choosing to remain in
the Cleveland public schools, thereby seemingly providing a financial incentive to opt out of public
schooling. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 697-98 (Souter, J., dissenting). The majority, however, focuses on the
fact that the amount of state money going to Cleveland public schools, including community and magnet
schools, is two to three times more than can be paid to a religious school. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 654. The
majority also emphasizes that children choosing to remain in public school have no co-pay obligation but
that families choosing private schooling are obligated to pay a portion of the private school tuition, thereby
creating an additional disincentive to choose religious schooling. Id.
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“[T]he basic principle of establishment scrutiny of aid remains the principle . . . that there may be no
public aid to religion or support for the religious mission of any institution.” Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 884
(Souter, J., dissenting). “[E]ven a genuine choice criterion is [not] up to the task of the Establishment
Clause when substantial state funds go to religious schooling.” Zelman, 536 U.S. at 703 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
61
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 708 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870-72 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that public support of religion “violates the fundamental principle of freedom of
conscience,” that it “corrupts religion,” and that it “is inextricably linked with conflict”).
63
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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II. The Privatization Rationales
As I noted at the outset, rights of conscience, the potential for government to harm
religion, and social peace are not inappropriate objects of concern. The burden of this
part of the paper, however, is to illustrate the superficial character of the scrutiny Justice
Souter and other adherents of the privatization thesis give to these issues.

A. Freedom of Conscience
Justice Souter opposes the expenditure of neutrally available public funds in
religious schools on the grounds that Thomas Jefferson’s Virginia Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom and James Madison’sMemorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments “establish clearly that liberty of personal conviction requires freedom from
coercion to support religion, and this means that the government can compel no aid to
fund it.”64 Specifically, Justice Souter cites Jefferson for the proposition that neutrally
available funds spent in religious schools violate rights of conscience by infringing upon
the principles that “no one ‘shall be compelled to . . . support any religious worship,
place, or ministry whatsoever’”65 and that “’compel[ling] a man to furnish contributions
of money for propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; . . .
even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own persuasion, is depriving
him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose
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Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5
The Founders’ Constitution 84 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner, eds. 1987). The title of the document Justice
Souter purports to be citing does not match the page number he gives. Jefferson’s A Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom is reprinted in the Kurland and Lerner volume at page 77. On page 84 is the Virginia
Act for Establishing Religious Freedom. It makes no difference which document Justice Souter intended to
cite, however, for the passages he relies on are in both documents.
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morals he would make his pattern.’”66 Madison is cited for the belief that freedom of
conscience is violated “by any ‘authority which can force a citizen to contribute three
pence . . . of his property for the support of any . . . establishment’”67 Taken together,
Jefferson’s Act and Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance establish that“’[a]ny tax to
establish religion is antithetical to the command that the minds of men always be wholly
free.’”68
There are several possible objections to Justice Souter’s claim that Jefferson and
Madison authoritatively establish that the use of neutrally available public funds in
religious schools amounts to a despotism over the mind. One objection I will note but
not pursue is Justice Souter’s belief that the outcome of the debate in Virginia in the
1780s over religious freedom, in which Madison and Jefferson played such prominent
roles, has constitutional status. This of course is not a new claim,69 and many objections
have been raised against it.70 Suffice it to say that given the “widespread and deep
division[s]” 71 over the meaning of religious liberty in the late eighteenth century, it is
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Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 871 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citing Everson v. Board of Ed. of
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 13).
67
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing the Memorial and Remonstrance ¶ 3, reprinted in
Everson, 330 U.S. at 65-66).
68
Id. (citation omitted).
69
In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Supreme Court declared that “the provisions of
the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading
roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protections against governmental
intrusion on religious liberty as the [Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty],” originally written by Jefferson.
Id. at 13. More recently, Justice Souter has declared that Madison’s “authority on questions about the
meaning of the Establishment Clause is well settled.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
70
See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious
Freedom (1995). In commenting upon the claim in the majority opinion in Everson that the establishment
clause has the same meaning as Jefferson’s Statute for Religious Freedom, Smith notes that “the Court took
no notice of the obvious objection to imposing the Virginia policy on a constitutional provision that had an
entirely different wording and that was adopted by a different, and very differently composed, body.” Id. at
46.
71
Daniel O. Conkle, “Legal Theory: Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause,” 82 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1115, 1133 (1988). Given the profound disagreement over the meaning of religious freedom in the
late eighteenth century, Conkle asks
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exceedingly unlikely that the men in Congress and in the state legislatures that ratified the
First Amendment believed that they were writing into the constitution the views of
Jefferson and Madison to the exclusion of all others.

how could Congress and the ratifying state legislatures have reached agreement
on the establishment clause? It was supported, after all, both by separationists
and by those who were committed to programs of state-sponsored religion.
These various political actors simply could not have agreed on a general
principle governing the relationship of religion and government, whether it be
the principle endorsed in Everson or any other. If the establishment clause had
embraced such a principle, it would not have been enacted.
Id. Conkle goes on to argue that the establishment clause is simply a jurisdictional statement
making it clear that in denying Congress the authority pass any “law respecting the establishment
of religion” the constitution had not withdrawn legislative authority over religion from the states.
Id. Similar arguments are made by, among others, Stanley Ingber, “Religion or Ideology: A
Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses,” 41 Stan. L. Rev. 233, 307 (1989) (arguing that
“[t]he language of the [establishment] clause was directed against congressional creation of a
national church or favoritism of one ecclesiastical sect over another. Thus, its predominant intent
was to protect state religious establishments from national displacement.”); Charles Fried, “The
Supreme Court, 1994 Term: Foreword: Revolutions?,” 109 Harvard L. Rev. 13, 52-53 (1995)
(contending that “[t]here is little doubt that the Establishment Clause (quite apart from its opening
words ‘Congress shall make no laws’) was specifically intended to preserve a freedom of action to
the states while denying it to the national government.”); and Stephen L. Carter, “Reflections on
the Separation of Church and State,” 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 293 (2002), insisting that
[s]urely the [establishment] clause means what it says, and no more than that.
At the moment of the founding, the majority of states had official, statesupported, established churches, and all but two required religious tests for
public office. The states were not giving these powers away. On the contrary,
they wanted to protect their own established churches from interference by the
new national government, and also wanted to prevent the national government
from establishing a church of its own.
Id. at 299. Smith, supra note 70, at 19-22, notes that there was widespread support in America in the late
eighteenth century for the notion that religion was necessary for good republican government, but that there
was sharp disagreement over whether government itself should promote religion or whether religion should
be left to private, voluntary initiatives. Given this disagreement, Smith, like the authors noted above,
argues that the establishment clause is simply a jurisdictional statement but also insists that the free
exercise clause is as well. Id. at 35-43. “Given the controversies that in fact existed in the new nation over
‘free exercise’ issues, it seems most plausible to understand the free exercise clause, like the establishment
clause, as expressing a jurisdictional decision to leave substantive issues [of religious freedom] to be
resolved by the states.” Id. at 42.
Douglas Laycock argues, however, that the federalism interpretation of the religion clause is mistaken and
that the establishment clause does in fact protect individual rights. See Douglas Laycock, “Theology
Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the
Liberty,” 118 Harvard Law Review 155, 241-43 (2004); “’Nonpreferential’ Aid to Religion: A False Claim
About Original Intent,” 27 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 875, 885-94 (1986).
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For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that the establishment clause is
simply a restatement of Jefferson’s and Madison’s views. The question then is: do their
views unmistakably establish that governmental programs of the type at issue in Mitchell
and Zelman represent a tyranny over the mind? In other words, is “the command ‘that
the minds of men always be wholly free’”72 violated when government aid is spent in
religious schools “’only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of
individuals’”?73 The first difficulty one encounters in trying to answer this question
involves the not insignificant challenge of applying Jefferson’s and Madison’s principles
of religious liberty to a world quite different from the one in which they were articulated.
To give but one example—if an example is needed—consider that the expenditures of the
federal government for the period 1789-1791 were $4,269,00074 but by 2002 had grown
to exceed $2 trillion. 75 And this says nothing of the growth of state and local
governments over this period,76 nor of the exponentially increased reach of all levels of
governments into the lives of citizens today. Because of the great difficulty of computing
the relative value of a dollar, it is hard to say with any precision just how many times
larger the federal government is today as compared to 1791. The point, though, is that
given that Jefferson’s and Madison’s views on religious liberty were part of a set of
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Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 871 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. at 12);
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997)).
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Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2, 1115 (1976) Table entitled
“Outlays of the Federal Government: 1789-1970.”
75
Economic Report of the President 381 (2004) Table B-82 “Federal and state and local government
current receipts and expenditures, national income and product accounts (NIPA), 1959-2003.”
76
Total state and local government spending in 2002 was about $1.4 trillion. Ibid.
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beliefs that also included belief in limited government, does it make any sense to invoke
the former when we have rejected the latter?77
I am not sure how to begin to answer the question. It seems to me, however, that
some explanation is in order if someone wishes to claim, as Justice Souter does, that
Jefferson’s and Madison’s principles of religious liberty unequivocally establish that the
use of public funds in religious schools by means of religiously neutral criteria and the
individual choices of aid recipients amounts to a despotism over the mind. Some
explanation that would at a minimum attempt to explain why in circumstances of an
expansive bureaucratic state the indirect support of religion—as in Mitchell and
Zelman—is anymore “antithetical to the command that the minds of men always be
wholly free” than other public expenditures to which people object. Perhaps Justice
Souter is right, that even in the modern regulatory state wherein government spends few
of the trillions of dollars it spends each year in a way that fails to offend any number of
people, indirect publicsupport of religion nevertheless represents a tyranny over the
mind. Yet it behooves him, it seems to me, to explain how this is true. Unfortunately,
Justice Souter and other justices committed to the privatization of religion betray not a
hint of believing that there is any complexity to the issue. The sprawling growth in the
size of government over the last two centuries and with it the enormous extension of its
reach into the lives of citizens is something that Justice Souter simply does not note. For
him and the other privatization justices, the use of neutrally available public funds in
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Smith, supra note 70, at 148-9 n. 24, writes that “following Locke, Jefferson’s views about religious
freedom [] rested heavily on a minimalist conception of the proper functions of the state. That minimalist
conception hardly commands a consensus today. Hence, it is unclear why current judges or legal scholars
should feel entitled to invoke Locke’s or Jefferson’s conclusions about religious freedom when they reject
the premises from which those conclusions were derived.”
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religious institutions amounts straightforwardly to an establishment of religion that
tyrannizes the minds of citizens.
Having raised the question of whether the demise of limited government
undermines Justice Souter’s application of Jefferson’s and Madison’s principles to
invalidate the expenditure of neutrally available public funds in religious schools, let us
return to the substantive issue of whether the Act for Establishing Religious Freedom and
the Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments clearly establish that the
use of such funds in this way actually amounts to the establishment of religion and,
hence, to a tyranny over the mind.78 Recent scholarship suggests that Justice Souter is
wrong on this score, at least as regards Madison and the Memorial and Remonstrance.
Vincent Phillip Mu oz argues that Madison’s central teaching of religious liberty
is that the state may not take “cognizance” of religion. 79 That is, after first arguing in the
Memorial and Remonstrance that religion is an inalienable natural right, Madison writes
that “therefore that in matters of Religion, no mans [sic] right is abridged by the
institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”80
What the “noncognizance” of religion requirement means, writes Mu oz, is that the state
lacks jurisdiction over religion. It may not take authoritative notice of or
perceive religion or the religious affiliation of its citizens. A government
78

Recall that in support of his claim that the expenditure of neutrally available public funds in religious
schools violates rights of conscience, Justice Souter invokes Jefferson for the principle that “no one ‘shall
be compelled to . . . support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever’” and for the contention
that ‘”compel[ling] a man to furnish contributions of money for propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; . . . even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own
persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor,
whose morals he would make his pattern.’” See supra text accompanying notes 65-69. Madison is cited
for the idea that freedom of conscience is violated “by any ‘authority which can force a citizen to contribute
three pence . . . of his property for the support of any . . . establishment.’” See supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
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Vincent Phillip Mu oz, James Madison’s Principle of Religious Liberty, 97 American Political Science
Review 17, 22-23 (2003).
80
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, Article 1, in 5 The
Founders’ Constitution 82 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner, eds. 1987).
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noncognizant of religion, in other words, must be blind to religion. It
cannot use religion or religious preferences as a basis for classifying
citizens. This is the doctrinal teaching of the “Memorial and
Remonstrance.” The state, which is a product of the social compact
between men originally born in the state of nature, must remain
noncognizant of religion because religion is not part of the social compact.
Religion cannot be part of the social compact because of the inalienable
character of man’s right to direct his religion according to conviction and
conscience.81

The noncognizance principle means that government “must remain blind to religion as
such. It can neither privilege religion nor punish citizens on account of their religion.”82
If Madison is the authoritative guide to the establishment clause, as Justice Souter
claims,83 a “Madisonian approach to the First Amendment would utilize the
straightforward rule that the state must remain noncognizant of religion. No state actor or
government policy could classify, punish, distribute, or withhold benefits from individual
citizens or organizations on account of religion or religious affiliation.”84 In other words,
the constitution must be “religion-blind.”85
Mu oz’s interpretation of Madison’s claim that religion is “wholly exempt” from
the state’s “cognizance” is supported by Vincent Blasi. Like Mu oz, Blasiargues that
Madison’s principle of noncognizance of religion means that the state has no
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Mu oz, supra note 79, at 23.
Mu oz, supra note 79, at 29.
83
See supra note 69.
84
Mu oz, supra note 79, at 29. Mu oz claims only that the noncognizance approach to religion represents
Madison’s view, not that it also represents the intent of the men who ratified the First Amendment. Mu oz,
supra note 80, at 29 n. 38.
85
Mu oz, supra note 79, at 29. In the free exercise context, Mu oz argues that the principle of
noncongizance “prohibits the government from making laws that single out a religion or religion generally
for unfavorable treatment. It would also deny the government the authority to make laws or exemptions
singling out a religion or religion generally for favorable treatment under the law.” Id. at 31. Mu oz thus
concludes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1990),
declaring that the free exercise clause does not exempt religious individuals and groups from laws of
general applicability that have the effect of incidentally burdening religion, is consistent with Madison’s
noncognizance principle. Id.
82

22

“jurisdiction” over religion or “responsibility” for it.86 As Blasi explains, the
noncognizance principle means that the state “has no authority to attempt to influence,
facilitate, or promote . . . [religious] beliefs and practices. That responsibility belongs
exclusively to the individual believer and the voluntary associations he forms.”87 For
Madison, moreover, the state’s failure to r espect the noncongnizance principle meant that
it had established religion. That is, according to Blasi a “religious establishment” was for
Madison “any instance of government taking ‘cognizance’ of, that is responsibility for,
religion.”88 Blasi argues, in other words, that Madison’s notion of separation of church
and state did not seek to confine religion to the private sphere, but to deny government
any authority over the religious beliefs of citizens. As Madison wrote in the Memorial
and Remonstrance, “[t]he Religion . . . of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate. . . . It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such
only as he believes to be acceptable to him.”89 Separation of church and state for
Madison then requires “a separation of functions and purposes, not some quixotic attempt
to achieve a hermetically sealed spatial separation.”90
Applying the noncognizance principle to issues that the Supreme Court has
decided helps to illustrate the Madisonian approach. Mu oz persuasively makes the case,
for example, thatMadison’s principle was violated by the Courtin Marsh v. Chambers,91
where it upheld the constitutionality of publicly-funded legislative chaplains, and in Walz
86

Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 783, 789 (2002).
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Blasi, supra note 86, at 790.
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Blasi, supra note 86, at 791.
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Madison, supra note 80, at 82.
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Blasi, supra note 86, at 791.
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v. Tax Commissioners of New York City,92 where it found no constitutional violation in
the granting of property tax exemptions to religious organizations for property used
solely for religious worship. Both conclusions violate the noncognizance principle in that
government took “authoritative notice of religion”—in Marsh both by hiring on the basis
of religion, i.e., hiring a minister, and promoting a religious exercise (prayer); and in
Walz by conferring a benefit on the basis of religion.93 By the same token, Mu oz argues
that the decisions removing official religious practices from the public schools are
consistent with the principle of noncognizance in that government quite obviously (and
improperly) takes note of religion when it promotes religious activities.94
Mu oz convincingly contends, moreover, that “[t]he principle of ‘noncognizance’
. . . forbids the state from using religious affiliation to exclude individuals or
organizations from generally available benefits.”95 To this end, Mu oz contends that the
Court’s decisions in Mueller v. Allen96 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia97 were consistent with the Madisonian approach. The law at issue
in Mueller entitled all families with children enrolled in elementary and secondary
schools to take a tax deduction for education expenses, which of course benefited
families enrolled in religious schools. However, because the tax exemption was available
to all families with school-age children, the law “did not inquire into the religious
character of the child’s school[,]” which meant that “the state remained noncognizant of
religion.”98 In Rosenberger, however, the University of Virginia did take cognizance of
92
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religion by inquiring into the religious character of student groups that applied for
student-activity funds that were made available on the basis of nonreligious criteria. The
Supreme Court declared the policy unconstitutional because it violated the free speech
rights of a Christian student organization, but as Mu oz argues,
[a] Madisonian interpretation of the First Amendment would have reached
the same result on the grounds that to deny a student newspaper generally
available newspaper funds because their paper contains religious content
subjects religious students to a particular disability. The university
became unconstitutionally cognizant of religion by singling out religious
activities for exclusion from generally available funds.99

In other words, once the university chose to fund student newspapers, in order to have
remained “blind to religion,” it could not inquire into the religious character of the
newspapers.
As regards the issue of public funds going to religious schools, Mu oz argues that
the Madisonian approach would adjudicate the issue like any other policy
of governmental funding. The government may not use religious
affiliation as a classification or criterion for either privilege or penalty.
The government may not fund schools because they are religious, but it
also may not fund schools only because they have a religious affiliation.
If the government chooses to adopt a general policy to fund educational
programs in public and private schools, it may not adopt standards that
take religion into account.100
The “religion-blind” requirement, as Mu oz notes,101 supports the Supreme Court’s
recent decisions in the religious schooling context permitting the use of a publicly-funded
sign-language interpreter by a student enrolled in a Catholic school,102 publicly-funded
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teachers teaching enrichment and remedial courses in religious schools,103 the loaning to
religious schools of instructional materials purchased with public money,104 and the
participation of religious schools in a publicly-funded voucher program.105 To have
denied the religious interests the ability to participate in general funding programs—as
Justice Souter, in pursuit of the privatization of religion, would have done,106—would
have imposed a particular burden on religion, which the noncognizance principle forbids.
Blasi focuses only on the issue of religious school vouchers and he too concludes
that they do not violate Madison’s principle of noncognizance. That is, vouchers do not
“place the state in the position of taking responsibility for the religious beliefs of its
citizens.”107 “There are secular educational objectives served by a voucher system,”
Blais writes,
that are not bound up with the religious beliefs of its participants. Even
when those secular educational benefits are delivered by religious
authority figures, acting out of religious motives and functioning in a
‘pervasively sectarian’ environment, the state has not adopted an
educational strategy that gives it a stake in the religious beliefs of its
citizens.108

The Supreme Court did not of course in any of the cases Mu oz analyzes claim to
be following Madison’s principle of noncognizance. It seems, however, that its analysis
in aid cases is now essentially a “noncognizance” inquiry. That is, Zelman makes clear
that public assistance laws pass establishment clause scrutiny so long as they have a
103
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secular purpose and do not define recipients on the basis of religion nor attempt to direct
recipients to religious alternatives, even when significant amounts of public money end
up in religious schools.109 The secular purpose requirement and the requirement that aid
be distributed on the basis of nonreligious criteria are investigations, under the modified
Lemon test, into whether the government has acted neutrally with regard to religion.110
Asking whether a law is neutral (understood as evenhandedness)111 is also to ask whether
the state has taken congnizance of religion. Nonneutrality indicates cognizance of
religion, which in Madisonian terms denotes an establishment of religion, which is
prohibited. In the public assistance cases, then, the Court now seems to perform basically
a Madisonian noncognizance inquiry. If Mu oz’s interpretation of Madison is correct,
there is more than a little irony in Justice Souter’s dogged insistence that the Court has
betrayed Madison in its recent public assistance pronouncements. Instead, it is his use of
religious affiliation as a classification for penalizing citizens that contravenes Madison’s
principle of religious liberty.
In addition to questioning Justice Souter’s rather simplistic understanding of
Madison and Jefferson, let us consider more directly the concept of “freedom of
conscience” and what it means. Irrespective of what the best reading of Jefferson’s and
Madison’s principles is, it seems strange to claim that my rights of conscience are
violated when others are permitted to share in a governmental resource they too have
contributed to and in which I already have drawn from. For example, my family resided
in the state of Ohio earlier this decade when the Cleveland voucher program was in place
and when Zelman was decided. In the year following the Zelman decision—the 2002-03
109
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academic year—my children and over 1.8 million other children were enrolled in Ohio
elementary and secondary public schools.112 By contrast, about 4,200 students in the
Cleveland district were then using their education vouchers in religious schools.113
Justice Souter claims that such expenditures violate the rights of conscience of all citizens
of Ohio. But in what sense were my rights or the rights of anyone violated by the use of
vouchers in religious schools? The vouchers support education,114 not a minister or
missionary or the like. No one’s taxes were increased in order to channel money to
religious schools. The state’s claim on me, i.e., my tax obligation, was the same whether
religious schools participated in the voucher program or not. The use of voucher funds in
religious schools, moreover, did not interfere with my family’s—nor I would argue with
anyone else’s—ability to live by our own best lights, that is, according to the beliefs and
values that give meaning and purpose to our lives, that make our lives our own.
In other words, it seems to me that to find a genuine infringement of rights of
conscience there must be some real interference with what the political philosopher
William Galston calls “expressive liberty.” That is, an important feature of liberty is
expressive liberty, which Galston defines as “[t]he ability of individuals and groups to
live in ways consistent with their understanding of what gives meaning and purpose to
life.”115 Governmental interference with rights of conscience denies individuals and
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groups the right to define for themselves how they would live. It is to compel others to
live in a way they would not but for the governmental compulsion.116
What Galston’s discussion of freedom of conscience suggests is that there has
been no violation of rights of conscience (and expressive liberty) unless government
meddles into the lives of citizens in a way thatinterferes with thei r ability to live
according to their own best lights. To this end, Galston argues that compulsory flag
salute and Pledge of Allegiance laws that require some citizens to violate their religious
beliefs are forbidden infringements upon conscience.117 Such laws interfered, without a
compelling governmental interest, with the ability of Jehovah’s Witnesses to live and to
raise their children according to the dictates oftheir consciences. It is precisely this
element of interference with one’s way of life that is missing from Justice Souter’s claim
that the use of neutrally available public funds in religious schools violates rights of
conscience. As I stated in the preceding paragraph, the expenditure of public funds in
religious schools by means of neutral governmental programs involves absolutely no
interference with the ability of citizens to live according to their own best lights. One
may believe that funding programs such as those at issue in Zobrest, Agostini, Mitchell,
and Zelman are unwise, even foolish, but they in no way impair one’s ability to believe
and live as one sees fit. One is free to continue believing or not believing whatever one
does about God, to continue worshiping or not worshiping God in the same way as before
116
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the institution of the programs. One is likewise free to continue raising children as
before, to pursue what one values, to set and follow one’s own life plan. In short, it is
difficult to understand how, per Justice Souter, rights of conscience are violated when
neutrally available public assistance is routed to religious schools by the independent
choices of aid recipients.
A critic might object that Justice Souter is merely relying on the authority of
Madison for his claim about rights of conscience and that my real quarrel is with him. As
the discussion of Mu oz’s and Blasi’s interpretations of the Memorial and Remonstrance
suggests, however, religion-neutral government programs are not instances of
government taking congnizance of, or responsibility for, religion.118 If this is the case, it
would then seem to follow that neither do such programs impair rights of conscience.
This conclusion is buttressed by considering theMemorial and Remonstrance in the light
of Galston’s concept of expressive liberty. Recall that Madison wrote the Memorial and
Remonstrance in response to Patrick Henry’s A Bill Establishing a Provision for
Teacher’s of the Christian Religion. As the title of the bill suggests, Henry was
proposing a property tax to explicitly fund the teaching of Christianity.119 Had Henry’s
bill become law, it not only would have violated Madison’s injunction against
government taking congnizance of religion but would have also clearly hindered the
“ability of individuals and groups to live in ways consistent with their understanding of
what gives meaning and purpose to life.”120 We need not speculate on just how much
Henry’s bill would have interfered with the liberty of various Christian groups or
denominations, for it plainly would have violated the expressive liberty of non118
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Christians, who would have been taxed for the support of a faith not their own.
Requiring non-Christians to support Christianity undeniably interferes with their ability
to live in a way that reflects their judgments about what gives value and meaning to their
lives. Henry’s bill was thus unlike contemporary government assistance programs in
which individuals are not taxed for the support of religion—in Madisonian terms,
government has not taken cognizance of religion—but for the provision of legitimate
governmental services, e.g., educational and disability services.121
Justice Souter claims, mantra-like, that the outlay of neutral public funds to
religious schools violates freedom of conscience. He makes this assertion as though the
claim alone were a trump. Even if we assume with Justice Souter that the First
Amendment embodies Jefferson’s and Madison’s views to the exclusion of all others, he
fails to explain why we should accept their views on the relationship between church and
state when we have rejected their views on the proper scope of the latter.122 What is
more, Mu oz’s and Blasi’s writings on the Memorial and Remonstrance give us strong
reason to doubt that Justice Souter has correctly understood Madison’s principles of
religious liberty.123 Finally, I have suggested that in order to establish an actual violation
of rights of conscience there must be some denial of what Galston calls expressive
liberty, which is absent in the neutral funding cases.124

B. Saving Religion from its Own Corruption
The second reason Justice Souter gives in support of the claim that the constitution
confines religion to the private sphere is that the First Amendment aims also to protect the purity
121
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of religion from corruption. Like his claim about freedom of conscience, Justice Souter’s
argument about protecting religion from corruption rests upon Madison’s Memorial and
Remonstrance. One of the reasons Madison opposed Henry’s bill was his belief that
“ecclesiastical establishments” corrupted “the purity and efficacy of Religion” by producing
“pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition,
bigotry, and persecution.”125 Justice Souter does not claim that the threat today to the purity of
religion is quite the same as in Madison’s day. He argues instead that the integrity of religion is
threatened by “corrosive secularism” thatjeopardizes the ability of religious schools “to educate
the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of their faith.”126 His concern is
that government regulations accompanying public funds will undermine the particular identity of
religious schools in which public funds are expended. That is, the corruption of religion that
Justice Souter believes the establishment clause protects against is the compromises the faithful
might make with their own beliefs in order to qualify for public funds. He cites as an example
the fact that the voucher program at issue in Zelman prohibits religious discrimination, which
prevents participating religious schools from favoring in the admissions process students of the
school’s faith,127 and he speculates that the prospect of additional state funding may ultimately
lead religious schools to exchange their relative independence and particular identities for
increased public money.128
That religious beliefs and identities might be undermined by the acceptance of
public funds is certainly a validconcern , and is a topic that deserves more attention than I
can devote here. Several points are worth noting, however. First, one doubts that Justice
125
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Souter and other adherents of the privatization thesis truly grasp the problem that an
expansive regulatory state presents to religious believers who wish to safeguard the
integrity of their faith. For example, does not the state’s monopoly on education funds
exert substantial pressure on the religious to compromise their beliefs? That is, as
Eugene Volokh has observed,
many religious parents object on religious grounds to many aspects of the
curriculum and environment in government-run public schools. The offer
of a free education in government-run schools puts these parents to the
choice of (1) taking this government subsidy and compromising their
religious objections to the curriculum or environment or (2) sticking by
their beliefs but losing the subsidy.129

The prevalence of religious schools in this country indicates that many families are
unwilling to compromise their religious beliefs. The inability to afford religious
schooling, however, undoubtedly leads many religious parents to accept the subsidy and
comprise their beliefs.130 If the establishment clause is intended to prevent the state from
placing individuals in a situation in which they will be tempted to comprise their religious
beliefs, as Justice Souter maintains, then it would seem that public schooling itself
violates the establishment clause. If the threat of secularism to religious belief is the
concern, how much more of a threat this must be in the context of public schooling, given
its pervasively secular character. Denying parents the option of spending neutrally
available education funds in religious schools thus would hardly begin to remedy the
problem the secular state presents to the integrity of religious belief. In short, concern
that governmental policies may lead individuals to comprise their religious beliefs must
129
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also include attention to the fact that that the existing structure of schooling already leads
to just this result.
While Justice Souter ignores the more widespread threat to religious belief that
secular public schooling presents, the possibilitynevertheless exists that legislatures will
permit families to direct neutral educational funds only to religious schools willing to
bend their religious beliefs. As Justice Souter points out, for example, religious schools
participating in the Cleveland voucher program cannot in the admissions process favor
students of the schools’ faith.131 Although this relatively mild qualification does not
interfere with religious instruction in the schools, one wonders if the Supreme Court itself
is not mainly responsible for restrictions of this type, and for more onerous ones like the
one in the Milwaukee voucher program, where religious schools are forbidden from
requiring voucher students to participate in religious activities.132 That is, the Court’s
many establishment clause pronouncements have not provided the clearest guidance for
legislatures. And until its decision in Zelman, the constitutional fate of vouchers was
very much up in the air. Perhaps the limitation on religious schools in Cleveland and
Milwaukee were simply good faith efforts by policymakers to structure the scholarship
programs—given the state of law at the time—in a way most likely to ensure that they
passed the constitutional scrutiny thatwas certain to follow. The education of poor
children trapped in failing public schools was at stake, after all. In other words, it is not
clear that legislatures will inevitably seek to undermine the religious identity of religious
schools.133 This is especially so given that the Zelman decision itself does not appear to
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require religious schools to be so hamstrung as a condition for participating in neutral
public programs. Zelman makes clear, in other words, that when recipients of neutral
public aid direct that aid to religious schools, the promotion of religion is attributable to
the free and independent choices of the recipients, not to the state.134 There thus appears
to be no establishment clause requirement that religious schools trim their principles in
order to participate in neutral funding programs.135
Finally, note the off-putting paternalism present in Justice Souter’s claim that the
establishment clause prohibits the participation of religious schools in neutral public
programs so as to protect the integrity of religion. To be sure, an expansive regulatory

attempts to accommodate the needs of religious children in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
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state presents a real danger to the vitality of religious belief. But as I have suggested,
prohibiting religious schools from participating in neutral public programs hardly begins
to address the issue.136 More fundamentally, Justice Souter’s position appears to presume
that the faithful cannot be trusted to preserve their religion, that Supreme Court justices
care more for the faith of the religious than do the religious themselves. I do not doubt
the genuineness of Justice Souter’s concern over the threat “corrosive secularism” poses
for religious belief. I do question, however, the presumption that the faithful cannot be
trusted to safeguard their faith, and thus that it is the responsibility of political elites to
guard it for them. What I mean is this: putting aside the reasonableness or
constitutionality of legislatures requiring religious schools to relax their religious
principles in order to participate in neutral public programs, if religious communities are
willing to abide by the terms legislators have established for such programs, should not
their decision be respected? Are not the faithful themselves in a much better position to
judge the threat to their religion, or lack thereof, accompanying participation in
government programs? A religious community might of course misjudge and find that
participation does jeopardize its beliefs and integrity, but so might Justice Souter
misjudge and see a threat where one does not exist. Upon recognizing that participation
does tug too sharply towards secularism, a religious school or community would,
presumably, be free to withdraw from the program. How is the error corrected, however,
when religious schoolsare denied the opportunity to participate in neutral public
programs on the mistaken belief that the exclusion is necessary to safeguard the purity of
religion?
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A critic might concede that the Supreme Court’s paternalism will at times be
mistaken, that it will “protect” religion when no protection is required, but nevertheless
respond that the stakes are too high for things to be otherwise. In other words, protecting
the purity of religion—protecting religious pluralism, really137—is of such value as to
outweigh the interest religious communities, who too may misjudge threats, have in
deciding themselves whether to accept the terms being offered. Better a blanket
prohibition to safeguard all religion, one might argue, even if the protection is
unnecessary in some cases. However well-meaning this position is, we still must ask
whether the heavy-handed paternalism is warranted. I believe it is not. First, I see no
basis for the presumption that religious communities cannot protect themselves.
Participation, both individually and institutionally, in neutral governmental programs,
like the Cleveland voucher program, is voluntary. It is not a case of the state
commandeering the religious schools and forcing their participation. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary then, should we not thus assume that these schools agreed to
participate, fully aware of the terms of the program, conditions that they—again, absent
evidence suggesting otherwise—presumably found acceptable? How religious schools in
Milwaukee responded to the opportunity to participate in that city’s voucher program is
instructive. The Milwaukee program prohibits religious schools from requiring voucher
students to participate in religious activity.138 Many religious schools declined to become
voucher schools on the grounds that the restriction would interfere with their religious
mission.139 Other schools, however, concluded that the constraint poses no threat to their
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religious mission and thus accept voucher students.140 As long as religious institutions
are not obligated to participate in public programs—something that would likely violate
the free exercise clause—and as long as they are free to withdraw from programs they
have participated in, I see no reason why the judgment of Supreme Court justices about
what constitutes a threat to religion should prevail over the judgments of the religious
themselves. In any case, the experience of religious schools eligible to participate in
Milwaukee’s voucher program seems to confirm what I have suggested—that religious
officials are capable of judging for themselves the threat participation in government
programs poses for their religion (and institutions).
A related reason for rejecting Justice Souter’s paternalism is that he is here doing
the very thing the Supreme Court has forbidden in other contexts. That is, in arguing that
the religious schools participating in Cleveland’s voucher program have compromised
their beliefs by accepting the restriction that prevents them from preferring in the
admissions process students of the schools’ faith,141 Justice Souter is making judgments
about whether a religious community’s beliefs are consistent with particular religious
doctrines. But judicial excursions into theology are prohibited by Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, where the Court declared that
it was unconstitutional for “civil courts to engage in the forbidden process of interpreting
and weighing church doctrine.”142 Presbyterian Church involveda dispute over church
property between two local churches and the national denomination that turned on
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whether certain actions of the latter “departed substantially” from church doctrine. If
such a departure was found, a second determination had to be made regarding how
significant the issue(s) on which the departure occurred were to church doctrine. In other
words, the judiciary was asked “to determine matters at the very core of religion—the
interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the
religion.”143 “Plainly,” the Court declared, “the First Amendment forbids civil courts
from playing such a role.”144
But isn’t this precisely the role Justice Souter is playing when he claims that
participation in the voucher program has compromised the beliefs of the religious
schools? Such a claim, after all, is a claim that the schools have departed from church
doctrine. To illustrate the point, let us focus on Catholicism and the fact that at the time
of the Zelman litigation 35 of the 46 religious schools (out of a total of 56 participating
private schools) enrolling voucher students were Catholic schools.145 To conclude that
the Catholic schools had compromised their religion, Justice Souter has to compare the
schools’ willingness to abide by the terms of the program against the teachings of the
Catholic Church. He is required, in short, to engage in theology, to interpret and weigh
Catholic teachings, as well as the religious traditions and doctrines of the other religions
operating schools that accept voucher students. As Presbyterian Church makes clear,
however, the free exercise clause prevents courts from becoming embroiled in theological
matters, from attempting to tell the faithful how to understand their own faith.
Beyond this structural restraint denying the Supreme Court (and all civil courts)
that authority to act as theologians, we may also question whether justices and judges
143

Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450.
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450.
145
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 681 (Thomas, J., concurring).
144

39

possess, in the first instance, the knowledge and insight requisite for theological
undertakings. In other words, how does Justice Souter know when a particular religious
community has compromised its principles? Is he or the Court generally so well versed
in the theologies of the various religious traditions in this country that he or it is in a
position to say to a religious community that it has violated its own principles? Justice
Souter believes that the religious voucher schools in Cleveland have compromised their
principles in order to qualify for the program; undoubtedly he would say the same of
religious schools in Milwaukee, who must abide the more serious limitation that permits
voucher students to opt out of religious instruction and activities. But such a conclusion
contradicts the self-understanding of at least the Catholic schools in Milwaukee, most of
which are participating in the voucher program.146 As the principal of one Milwaukee
Catholic high school put it, the opt-out provision did not interfere with the school’s
ability to “maintain [its] independence and [its] mission.”147 What may thus appear to an
outsider like Justice Souter to be a case of a religious community compromising its
beliefs in order to qualify for public funds may instead be to the community itself nothing
of the sort. Justice Souter thus aptly demonstrates that “[i]t is not within the judicial ken
to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of a
particular [believers’] interpretation of [their] creeds.”148
One may of course reasonably doubt that Justice Souter actually practices
theology, that he does the interpreting and evaluating of religious principles that would be
necessary to conclude that religious voucher schools have compromised their beliefs.
That is, there is no evidence in his Zelman opinion that he actually made any theological
146
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determinations, which is just as well since he is not a theologian. Instead, the
“compromise” claim is a bald assertion that the faithful have been unfaithful, that they
have violated their religious beliefs. It is an accusation that the religious have been
unfaithful to their God and to what their God requires of them. It is a very serious
charge.149 But what leads Justice Souter (and the other justices who joinedhis dissent) to
make such a serious charge, especially when no evidence is offered to indicate that
voucher schools have compromised their faith? Justice Souter indicates that the schools’
willingness to accept the restriction preventing them from preferring same-faith students
represents a compromise of belief. But as I have noted, he cannot know this without
weighing and evaluating the doctrines of the religions at issue, which he does not do, and
which in any event he is forbidden to do. Consequently, he cannot know whether any of
the schools have compromised their beliefs by accepting the same-faith preference
restriction. Why then the cavalier assertion that they have? It seems to me that the claim
is simply a form of moral badgering intended to shame and condemn religious believers
who would permit their institutions to participate in neutral public programs. His aim
seems to be to discourage such participation, to instill in the public consciousness the
notion that religious institutions necessarily betray their religion when they participate in
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neutral public programs. In the end, Justice Souter’s motivations for the severe allegation
he makes are unclear. However, if the constitution denies courts the authority to
“interpret[] and weigh[] church doctrine,”150 surely Supreme Court justices should thus
refrain from accusing the religious of having betrayed their God.
As I noted above, that policymakers may seek to secularize religious institutions
as a prerequisite to their participating in neutral programs is a legitimate concern. I have
argued, however, that by ignoring the threat the state’s monopoly on education funds
presents to religious belief, Justice Souter indicates that he does not truly understand the
secularization problem. Instead of chastising individuals and groups who would seek to
secularize religious schools, Justice Souter adopts a deeply paternalistic stance that seeks
to deny religious schools the opportunity to participate in neutral educational programs.
Such paternalism is unwarranted, I have argued, because religiousbelievers appear quite
capable of judging for themselves the threat participation presents to their religious
beliefs. In addition to his paternalism, Justice Souter’s concern about religious purity
involves him in a theological enterprise—something thatthe Court, in other contexts, has
acknowledged that it is ill-equipped for, and which in any event is forbidden by the First
Amendment.

C. Prevention of Social Conflict
The third pillarsupporting the privatization commitment is the claim that the
establishment clause confines religion to the private sphere because of “its inextricable
link with social conflict.”151 To be sure, this is a position “that once occupied the Court
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but” which now has been “rightly disregarded.”152 Nevertheless, those justices
committed to the privatization of religion cling to it, arguing that religion in the public
sphere will lead to social conflict as religious groups vie for public funds to support their
institutions and as “taxpayers who take their liberty of conscious seriously” mobilize to
prevent such expenditures.153 As with the concern over rights of conscience and the
potential for religion to become corrupted, social peace is certainly an important matter.
The problem, however, is that the historical and social analysis offered in support of the
claim is wholly unpersuasive. In fact, it is perhaps an overstatement to describe the
social conflict claim as resting on any meaningful analysis at all.
Although it is claimed that the prevention of religiously-motivatedsocial conflict
is one of the aims of the establishment clause, it is revealing that one finds no references
by any of the justices espousing this position to any original sources. Justice Souter, for
example, cites only other Supreme Court opinions, which themselves fail to marshal any
founding era arguments.154 As Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., argues, moreover, this
particular claim about the establishment clause is of recent vintage. 155 Gaffney
documents that it was first hinted at by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Walz
v. Tax Commission156 in 1970 and the next year, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,157 a majority of
the Court claimed it as one of the motivations behind the adoption of the First
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Amendment.158 Writing for the Court in Lemon Chief Justice Burger argued that
“political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
First Amendment was intended to protect.”159 As Gaffney notes, neither Justice Harlan
nor Chief Justice Burger reference any founding era arguments or sources in support of
their assertion about the intent of the establishment clause.160 Both rely instead on a 1969
Harvard Law Review article, which itself is “unadorned with any reference to primary
sources.”161 After reviewing congressional debates over the First Amendment and the
writings of Jefferson and Madison, Gaffney argues that the historical record cannot bear
the weight of the social conflict claim. The historical record, Gaffney writes, is devoid of
evidence indicating that “the founding fathers perceived political divisions along
religious lines as an evil and that they intended to avoid such conflicts by enacting the
first amendment.”162 Given that the establishment clause seems largely to be a
jurisdictional statement explicitly affirming that the new constitution did not withdraw
from the states the authority they then exercised over religion,163 it is not surprising that
Gaffney would reach this conclusion.
Not only does the alleged prevention-of-social-conflict motivation for the
establishment clause lack a credible historical foundation, as social policy it is a solution
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in search of a problem. That is, religion has had a place in the public sphere throughout
our nation’s history and it has engendered no deep or enduring social conflict. Consider
for example only the post-New Deal American political culture. As Justice O’Connor
points out in her Zelman concurrence, substantial public funds have long been channeled
to religious institutions “through public health programs such as Medicare . . . and
Medicaid . . . through educational programs such as the Pell Grant program . . . and the
G.I. Bill of Rights . . . and through childcare programs such as the Child Care and
Development Block Grant Program.”164 Religious institutions have additionally long
benefited, albeit indirectly, from tax policies permitting tax deductions for contributions
made to qualified religious organizations and from education policies establishing tax
credits for educational expenses, including those incurred at religious schools, and of
course property owned by religious institutions is generally exempt from state property
taxes.165 The annual value of the foregoing benefits is well into the billions of dollars,166
and yet one is hard pressed to identify any divisive political conflict provoked by these
examples of religion in the public sphere.167
Consequently, just as the claim that the founders intended the establishment
clause to be a safeguard against religiously motivated political divisiveness isfree of any
founding era references or arguments, the arguments about the divisiveness of religion in
the public sphere are likewise free of any meaningful American examples of religiously-
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motivated political divisions. There are instead the standard references to 17th century
European religious conflicts and to the established churches in colonial America that
persisted into the 19th century.168 The state-established churches in the late 1700s and
early 1800s were of course politically divisive, but these conflicts are inapposite, I
believe, to the evaluation of the divisiveness of religious institutions participating in
religiously-neutral public programs within the context of an expansive regulatory state.
If religiously-motivated social conflict were truly a problem requiring the privatization of
religion, one would expect to find examples ofit accompanying the public programs
noted in the preceding paragraph wherein billions of public dollars have directly and
indirectly helped religion. That no meaningful American examples of religious conflict
exist explains why Justice Souter and other privatization justices do not reference any,
and this perhaps helps us to understand why Justice Stevens now also looks to
contemporary international conflicts to support his claim that religion must be confined to
the private sphere. That is, Justice Stevens’ opposition to religion in the public sphere is
based not only on his “understanding of the impact of religious strife on the decision of
our forbears to migrate to this continent” but also on “the decisions of neighbors in the
Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East to mistrust one another.”169 One wonders
which is the more curious, Justice Stevens’ reduction of complex political, ethnic, and
religious differences to simply religious disputes or hisbelief that the political strife in
the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East is somehow instructive for gauging
the constitutionality of neutral, public American programs.
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My comments here should not be understood as an uncritical, unqualified
endorsement of religion in the public square, or a denial that religion holds any potential
for social harm. Clearly it does. Human history is replete with instances of great evil
committed in the name of religion. My contention simply is thatreligion has always had
some involvement in the public sphere in this country and yet the American experience
has been one largely free of serious, lasting religious conflict. This claim is reinforced, I
believe, bythe failure of the privatizat ion justices to identify any consequential American
examples of such divisiveness.
One might concede my point about the history of Americans of many religions
and of no religion living together more or less peacefully but argue that religious school
vouchers (as in Zelman) are different, that the lack of any serious social conflict over
neutral tax, higher education, healthcare, and childcare policies is uninstructive for
evaluating the potential political divisiveness of school choice programs. This essentially
is Justice Breyer’s position, who concedes that the “consequence [of religion in the public
sphere] has not been great turmoil” but argues that “[s]chool voucher programs differ . . .
in both kind and degree from” other types of neutral aid programs.170 Vouchers differ in
kind in that they “direct financing to a core function of the church: the teaching of
religious truths to young children,” which is “far more contentious than providing
funding for secular textbooks, computers, vocational training, or even funding for adults
who wish to obtain a college education at a religious university.”171 He also contends,
without referencing any historical examples, that“history shows that government
involvement in religious primary education is far more divisive than” any tax or
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healthcare programs that happen to benefit religion.172 Vouchers differ in degree from
other aid programs the Court has endorsed in that those provided only “limited amounts
of aid” whereas vouchers involve “a considerable shift of taxpayer dollars from public
secular schools to private religious schools.”173
While Justice Breyer is correct about how vouchers differ from other types of
public aid, it is not clear to me that vouchers will generate any more political division—
that is to say, any political division—than have the more limited aid programs the Court
has approved of in recent years.174 This of course is not to say that vouchers are
uncontroversial, or that some segments of American society do not ardently resist them.
It is to say, however, that the divisiveness reasoning is fundamentally flawed and has
been since it was first articulated in 1970. It is flawed because the publicdebateover
public aid to religious schools is not about religion or religious truths. It is instead a
debate about political principles—chiefly what justice and equality require as regards
schooling in a free society.175 In other words, the disagreement over public aid to
religious schools implicates no religious values, only political values; it is a political
dispute carried on by ordinary political means. What advocates of school vouchers and
other aid programs seek is not the establishment of a religious truth or some religious
orthodoxy but an end to the state’s monopoly over education funds. As Gerard Bradley
argues, the issue of public aid to religious schools “has never been agitated in a way
distinguishable from political conflict generally, and the Court has done nothing except
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assert, without a scintilla of evidence, the contrary.”176 To be sure, religion is in the
background, but in a religious society such as ours religion is in thebackground of
virtually every political issue. And yet does not the American experience confirm that
individuals and groups of different religions and of no religion are capable of living
together more or less peacefully? This point seems conceded not only by the failure of
the privatization justices to point to any meaningful American examples of religiously
motivated political strife but also by Justice Breyer’s acknowledgement that no previous
aid program has generated any such conflict.

III. Conclusion
Justice Souter and other justices stubbornly insist that the aim of the establishment
clause is to restrict religion to the private sphere. I have argued that the arguments in
support of this conclusion—respect for rights of conscience, preventing the corruption of
religion, and preserving social peace—are unpersuasive. It is my contention, moreover,
that analysis of these issues by the privatization justices is largely perfunctory, that no
real examination of the issues takes place. Instead of a meaningful analysis of religious
liberty, the privatization thesis rests upon conclusory statements about rights of
conscience, including a misreading of Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance;177 a
misguided paternalism—requiring the Court to weigh and evaluate religious doctrines, a
project for which it is ill-equipped—that ignores the threat the state’s monopolization of
public education funds presents to religion and at the same time wrongly assumes that
religious institutions participating in neutral government programs are incapable of
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safeguarding their faith;178 and, finally, seeks to protect the nation from a problem—
religiously-inspired social conflict—that is largely imaginary.179
To further illustrate the thinness of the claim that the establishment clause
banishes religion to the private sphere, consider the treatment of “public sphere” and
“private sphere” by the privatization justices. Interpreting the establishment clause to
require that religion be restricted to the private sphere follows a syllogism that goes like
this: “The establishment clause embodies Jefferson’s A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom and Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments.
These texts reflect the belief that religion should be confined to the private sphere. No
public funds may therefore be used for religious purposes, even when such funds reach
religious institutions only as a result of the free and independent choices of aid
recipients.” The problem with this syllogism is something that I noted earlier—the easy
assumption of the minor premise that the term “private sphere” has the same meaning
today as it did for Jefferson and Madison. Insofar as I can determine, the Supreme Court
has never explicitly defined what it means by the use of “private sphere” and “public
sphere.” However, it seems that the Court equates government and its activities with the
public sphere and that the private sphere consists of those areas of life which government
has not wholly regulated, i.e., those aspects of our lives in which we are relatively
unconstrained to live according to our own best lights.
If we understand “public sphere” to mean nothing more than whatever
government does, as the Supreme Court seems to, then it is axiomatic that the public
sphere has come to dwarf the private sphere. The privatization justices thus trivialize
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religion by refusing to confront this fact. Jefferson and Madison understood their
principles as expanding the sphere of human liberty. In contrast, crudely insisting that
religion must be limited to the private sphere in contemporary circumstances of an
expansive managerial state reduces the sphere of human liberty. Consider only the
example of public aid to religious schools, the issue around which much of the Court’s
establishment clause jurisprudence has been fashioned. All citizens are taxed for the
benefit of education, but under the privatization of religion interpretation of the
establishment clause religious schools are denied any meaningful public support.
Government schools alone are entitled to the educational tax proceeds. Such a scheme
clearly results in a reduction of liberty for families who wish for their children an
education that cannot be provided by state schools. To be sure, such families have the
liberty to send their children to religious schools,180 but the privatization principle denies
them the opportunity to draw on the educational fund to which they have contributed. It
is thus rather formalistic and crude to reflexively demand that religion be confined to the
private sphere without considering whether in the specific context liberty will be
promoted or impeded.181 The unwillingness to wrestle with such a crucial issue is
emblematic of the refusal of those justices who seek to confine religion to the private
sphere to seriously engage difficult issues of religious liberty. The casualness with which
these justices claim that the constitution requires religion to be restricted to the private
sphere suggests almost an eagerness to constrain religion. So much so that the
conclusion that religion must be confined to the private sphere seems more indicative of
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an a priori negative judgment about religion—as something unimportant, if not outright
dangerous, requiring no serious analysis—than it does of careful constitutional inquiry.182
Particularly underscoring this point is the fact that privatization justices seem incapable
of drawing any favorable conclusions from religion’s long involvement in the public
sphere, an association that has fostered no lasting social conflict.183 Refusing to notice
this, they dogmatically insist that religion must be confined to the private sphere so as to
avoid a problem that is largely nonexistent.
In criticizing the privatization claim I should not be understood as advocating any
particular boundary between religion and the state. That I believe and hope to have
shown that the privatization thesis is remarkably unpersuasive, that it has little to do with
either founding era arguments that brought the establishment clause into existence or with
182

In a manuscript in progress, see supra note 11, I argue that the belief that religion must be confined to
the private sphere is part of a comprehensive philosophical commitment about religion and individual and
social flourishing that is rooted in an understanding of the liberal political tradition that William Galston
calls “autonomy-centered.” Autonomy-centered liberalism, Galston argues, promotes “individual selfdirection in at least one of many senses explored by John Locke, Immanual Kant, John Stuart Mill, and
Americans writing in an Emersonian vein [and] is frequently linked with the commitment to sustained
rational examination of self, others, and social practices." Galston, Liberal Pluralism (2002) 21. It is
linked to an historical impulse often associated with the Enlightenment—namely,
liberation through reason from externally imposed authority. Within this context, reason
is understood as the prime source of authority; the examined life is understood as superior
to reliance on tradition or faith; preference is to be given to self-direction over external
determination; and appropriate relationships to conceptions of good or of value, and
especially conceptions that constitute groups, are held to originate only through acts of
conscious individual reflection on and commitment to such conceptions.

Ibid. at 24. Galston argues further that a number of cultural and political conflicts today are the
result of “the decision to throw state power behind the promotion of individual autonomy,” which
tends to “undermine individuals and groups that do not and cannot organize their affairs in
accordance with that principle without undermining the deepest sources of their identity.” Ibid.
The promotion of autonomy places the coercive powers of the state behind a partisan conception
of the good life; the state “takes sides in the ongoing struggle between reason and faith, reflection
and tradition. Autonomy-based arguments are bound to marginalize those individuals and groups
who cannot conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment impulse.” Ibid. at 25-26. Autonomycentered liberalism thus fails to take diversity seriously, and it often leads liberal societies to act
“in ways that reduce diversity.” Galston, “Two Concepts of Liberalism.” 105 Ethics 516 (1995)
522.
183

See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.

52

an informed awareness that religion has been for the most part peacefully involved in the
public sphere since the nation’s founding (and before) does not mean that the state should
promote religion by, say, official prayers and scripture readings in the public schools.
The point rather is that an uncritical commitment to confining religion to the private
sphere leads Justice Souter and other justices to hurry past, if not ignore, complex issues
of religious liberty. Instead of a searching inquiry into how, amidst deep religious
diversity and an ever expanding regulatory state, religious liberty can be protected for all,
we get abstract, conclusory arguments about the purported meaning of the establishment
clause. Wherever the just boundary between religion and state may lie, neither our
confidence in the Supreme Court’s ability to mark it nor the cause of religious liberty
itselfis furthered by dogmatic assertions that the constitution requires religion to be
confined to the private sphere.
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